Poor Poverty Statistics

Poverty is an awful social condition and many studies show that it produces a wide-array of negative externalities, including crime and substance abuse. Although eradicating poverty is a noble cause, elected officials frequently politicize the issue and use “poverty reduction” as a means of saving face and many interest groups stretch the definition of it to absurd lengths, which distracts us from discussing real, abject poverty in Canada and abroad.

The Cape Breton Post and the Chronicle Herald have given significant coverage to the issue following a report released by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA). The most shocking statistic in the report is that 33 per cent of children in Cape Breton are living in poverty. In 2014, one out of every three children in Canada live in poverty, which, from the outset, appears to be a terrible social blight that the government needs to rectify. Those calling for action would certainly be justified in doing so if the situation were as bad as they describe.

Statistics Canada does not have an official measure of poverty and the statistical agency said it would not institute one without Parliamentary consensus. It does, however, measure low-income individuals and families using multiple methods: the Low-income Cut Off (LICO), the Low-income Measure (LIM), and the Market Basket Measure (MBM). LICO and LIM measurements are relative measures of poverty. In other words, these measures determine poverty relative to another statistic, such as the median income. If income gains in the top 50 per cent of the income distribution were faster than in the bottom 50 per cent, for instance, these measures would make it seem as though more individuals have entered poverty. In the case of children, for instance, Statistics Canada noted that there was a statistically insignificant decrease in LICO rates between 1979 and 2009, whereas the LIM and MBM rates increased between 2008 and 2009.

The CCPA study relies on the After-tax Low Income Measure (AT-LIM) to gauge poverty rates in Nova Scotia, which defines poverty as 50 per cent of median income adjusted for family size. This measure and the CCPA study are problematic because relative measurements of poverty are not indicators of absolute wellbeing and the AT-LIM does not reflect income growth of low-income individuals: an increase of income for all groups would indicate that poverty has not improved. The nature of this measurement also allows for groups and politicians to define poverty according to their own ideological beliefs and gives them justification for implementing large social programs in the interest of eliminating poverty.


Measuring absolute poverty is a more accurate method to assess how many people are living in actual poverty. Chris Sarlo, a Senior Fellow with the Fraser Institute and economist at Nipissing University, used the “basic needs” approach to measure poverty. This method attempts to define the basic needs of individuals to sustain long-term physical wellbeing. Essentially, there is a basket of goods and the poverty line represents the amount of income necessary to obtain those goods. According to Sarlo’s calculations, this measure fell from 12 per cent of the population in 1973 to 5 per cent in 2004. Statistics Canada uses the MBM, which is a much broader basket than the Fraser Institute, and ideology, too, can shape the “basket of goods.” For instance, some baskets include university education, but one could reasonably argue that a lack of university education does not constitute abject poverty.

In its truest form, abject poverty is extremely problematic and requires a solution, however, its prevalence in Nova Scotia and Canada is largely exaggerated. Relative poverty, on the other hand, is typically rooted in a lack of economic opportunity in a given area and the best response is pro-growth policy–something the region has been sorely lacking for quite some time.

Corey Schruder is an AIMS on Campus Student Fellow who is pursuing an undergraduate degree in history at Cape Breton University. The views expressed are the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies

Against Smoking Bans in “Public Spaces”

In Canada, the government prohibits smoking in “indoor public spaces,” which, according to the law, consist of bars, restaurants, bowling alleys, etc. The term “indoor public spaces,” however, is misleading: they are public only in the sense that there are other people sharing the space, yet, many of these “indoor public spaces” are owned by private individuals. There are several reasons for protecting their right to choose whether they want a smoke-free or smoke-filled establishment.

Many complain that smoking in bars is encouraging to nonsmokers and exposes them to secondhand smoke. There are many reasons why this argument may not hold. For now, though, it is more important to focus on the demonization of smoking. By categorically prohibiting restaurant owners from allowing their customers to smoke inside, the government prevents people from doing something they may want to do, i.e. to smoke in a bar or own a bar that allows smoking). Smoking is not good or bad “in itself,” but, rather, it is only good or bad according to individual preference, including, but not limited to, the tradeoff of overall health for immediate pleasure, the terms of which some individuals would happily agree with. Moreover, there is an enormous amount of information detailing the economic, health, and social harms associated with smoking available to consumers that allows them to choose intelligently.

A popular argument for banning smoking in indoor public spaces pertains to workers’ rights: smoking indoors threatens employee health and welfare and because many workers do not have the convenience of choosing their place of employment–so the argument goes–allowing it forces them to choose between inhaling toxic cigarette fumes and unemployment.

To some extent, indoor smoking harms workers. Does that really justify banning it?

Closer examination of firm behavior demonstrates that it varies based on the economic implications of “safety.” Between 2008 and 2010, 700 construction workers died from workplace injuries in Canada. In addition, 637 individuals died in manufacturing workplaces and 329 in the transportation industry. Although these numbers may seem surprising, the theory of compensating differentials explains why outcomes in some industries differ from those in others.

According to the compensating wage differentials theory, workers are compensated by firms in a number of ways: these include wages, nonwage benefits, and working conditions. Any given individual has a set of preferences between these forms of compensation. A risk adverse employee, for instance, may be willing to give up much of his paycheck for a little more safety. Someone comfortable with risk, however, could be willing to put herself squarely in danger’s way for better pay. That some individuals are comfortable with more risk explains why construction workers, for instance, agree to work in dangerous settings: higher compensation allays most concerns, whereas lower compensation highlights them. Firms need to offer compensation for labour to attract workers—when they decrease safety, labour supply shrinks and forces the firm to boost wages. Thus, there is a positive correlation between risk and compensation. And there is no authoritatively “ideal” level of risk; instead, there is a multitude of individually preferred ones.

Thus, to attract workers, owners of establishments that allow smoking indoors would need to offer wages high enough to distract employees from the health hazard associated with working there (assuming these concerns are present). For some workers, the increase in pay would offset their health concerns. Similarly, restaurant owners must consider whether indoor smoking discourages consumers from eating at their establishment. If there is growing opposition to smoking, for example, restaurant owners must choose between allowing customers to smoke indoors and losing whatever percentage of their customer base that refuses to eat in an establishment that permits indoor smoking.

Examining both consumer and employee perspectives on smoking indoors lead to a common conclusion: laws dictating firm behavior typically enforce an arbitrary standard and ignore individual preferences. Instead, the government should allow property owners to decide what is best for their respective establishments and let people pursue their individual desires freely.

Michael Sullivan is a 2013-2014 Atlantic Institute for Market Studies’ Student Fellow. The views expressed are the opinion of the author and not necessarily the Institute

Against farm subsidies

Many countries, especially those in the West, support their farmers with generous agricultural subsidies. In 2011, for example, Canada spent $6.9 billion on them. These programmes, however, create inefficiency and lead to morally questionable outcomes.

Farm subsidies artificially reduce the cost of farming. In other words, farmers produce more in jurisdictions with subsidies than those without, i.e. subsidized farmers produce more than what would otherwise be profitable under purely competitive market conditions.

For instance, consider a developed country without farm subsidies. Farmers would use land that allows them to earn as much, or more, money than they could by renting it to the highest bidder. If this country introduced agricultural subsidies, farmers would purchase or rent additional land, since it would increase their revenue from the additional land above its market price (which, all things equal, was uneconomical before subsidization). Under competitive conditions, farmers would not utilize the additional land, whereas providing subsidies encourages them to do so.

Now, imagine a farmer who plans to purchase land in one of two countries. He must choose between Country A, which has extremely fertile land, and Country B, which has only passable land. If the cost of doing business and renting land were equal in both countries, he would likely choose Country A. However, if Country B offered subsidies that compensate him for utilizing less productive land, then he may opt to operate there, instead. In other words, agricultural subsidies are inefficient, in that they encourage farming on land that could be useful for building shopping malls, restaurants, or movie theatres. Moreover, subsidies create inefficiencies between countries with different agricultural policies.

These subsidies are more pervasive in the developed world than in its developing counterpart. Farmers in poorer countries are unable to compete with farmers in richer countries that offer artificially low factor prices resulting from lavish subsidies. As a result, these subsidies encouraging production in areas that are not especially suitable for agriculture, while discouraging production in areas that are suitable for farming. It is in the interest of developing countries to end agricultural subsidies, as it would allow them to expand their agricultural industries, which currently underperform due to subsidies in rich countries, and would alleviate rural poverty by boosting production and prices. Currently, however, richer countries “dump” their subsidized products in poorer countries, not only deteriorating their ability to generate economic activity, but also creating a dependency trap. From the perspective of richer countries that provide billions in annual subsidies, it is more efficient to stop transferring wealth to their agricultural industry and, instead, purchase foodstuffs from abroad.

Agricultural subsidies additionally affect wealth distribution at the domestic level. Policymakers fund the subsidies using tax revenue, which they transfer to farmers and landowners that tend to be wealthier than most; in 2011, the average income of a farm family was $93,426. That is, they redistribute wealth from the general population to a small group of wealthy individuals and firms. Indeed, contemporary “farming” is much different from its predecessor: most “farmers” are wealthier individuals and many farm operations involve large firms that use factories.

Farm subsidies also have a tendency to remain politically relevant–the special interest group behind farm subsidies is very powerful. It is politically expedient for governments to stay these benefits, as they require little funding per capita, yet, provide massive benefits to a small group. In other words, the cost of fighting these subsidies exceeds to cost of providing them in the first place. Moreover, when subsidies increase, this group begins to sense that they can generate more profit by lobbying the government than by actually producing foodstuffs or agricultural commodities.

Lastly, the farming lobby provides a massive obstacle to potential trade deals. In 2007, for instance, American and European governments’ objected to limiting their agricultural subsidies, which threatened the World Trade Organization’s Doha talks. India and Brazil, the countries proposing that western farm subsidies recede, in turn, refused to open their markets.

Proponents of agricultural subsidies typically defend their position by arguing that they benefit farmers and increase food security. However, in world of institutionalized trade relationships, there is little reason why any country should strive for food autarky at the expense of efficiency. Additionally, the age of rural poverty in rich countries is essentially over: farmers whom subsidies support tend to be quite wealthy. For these reasons, and those mentioned above, all states would be wise to stop subsidizing agriculture.

Michael Sullivan is a 2013-2014 Atlantic Institute for Market Studies’ Student Fellow. The views expressed are the opinion of the author and not necessarily the Institute