An Economic Exploration of Bilingualism, Part Two

In contrast with Montreal’s unique bilingual nature is New Brunswick, which is the only officially bilingual province in the country. That province often sets the pace for bilingual policy and with a roughly 33/66 per cent split between Francophones and Anglophones, it is proving ground for Canada-wide application.

New Brunswick’s largest linguistic minority are the Acadians, which is a group that the English had marginalized by the mid-18th century onward. Taking inspiration from the Franco-Quebecois awakening in the 1960s, the Acadians demanded greater inclusion in the then-Anglo dominated New Brunswick. The relatively poor and more isolated Acadian regions were able to use their size to elect a Francophone premier in 1960 who implemented an equalization plan that improved infrastructure and government services in those regions. This transformation amounted to a greater centralization of power in Fredericton. Nine years later, the provincial government enacted the Official Languages Act, which gave the French population equal status in the province. Most of the premiers elected since the enactment of that bill have been bilingual and sensitive to Francophone demands.

Today, New Brunswick remains Canada’s second-most bilingual province, with roughly 30 per cent of the population identified as bilingual (second only to Quebec with around 42 per cent).

It is important to note the differences between New Brunswick’s “brand” of bilingualism and that of Montreal. As I write in Part One, there has been no conscious effort in Montreal to promote bilingualism: it has arisen spontaneously from various structural and socioeconomic forces. The Anglo-Montrealer minority has had to bend to the will of the much larger Francophone majority and, thus, has not been a significant political force in the city. On the contrary, New Brunswick has an Anglophone majority with a very large, nationalistic Francophone minority. Bilingualism has been chiefly a political concern for New Brunswickers and has been largely manufactured, rather than spontaneous. It arose out of mobilization and demands for parity by what was then a marginalized minority, rather than economic necessity (or efficiency). Moreover, the movement had manifested itself largely through government: legislation, the civil service, and various social programs are bilingual imperative. The province’s education system, although segregated by district and language, focuses primarily on producing future generations of bilingual New Brunswickers. (In New Brunswick, the proportion of students enrolled in French immersion schools is the highest in Canada.)

Not all of New Brunswick’s linguistic history has been political, however, as much of the drive for bilingualism in the province was economically necessary. Statistically, bilingual members of the labour force end up with higher incomes, and boasting a bi- or multilingual workforce is an economic boon. In fact, it can measurably contribute to economic growth. Consequently, provincial governments in New Brunswick have focused on promoting bilingualism as a unique brand on the national and international scene to reap economic gains similar to those of multilingual European countries. At the same time, the province is quickly losing younger workers (especially bilingual Francophones), and the government is worried about upsetting the linguistic balance. In response, the provincial government has attempted to court Francophone and bilingual immigrants–a tough task with many competitors. Nonetheless, the province has experienced growth in service industries arguably attributable to this “bilingual branding.”

Once again, however, one must note that this “economic bilingualism” is the product of a planned effort by New Brunswick’s government and Francophone communities. In reality, the language of business and most government activities is English, which also tends to dominate public affairs. Very few Francophone New Brunswickers are unilingual, while many of their Anglophone counterparts speak only one language. Unlike in Montreal, there is much less pressure for Anglophones to learn French, and much more pressure for Francophones to learn English.

New Brunswick’s government is right to promote bilingualism as an economic asset. Evidence does show that multilingualism in places such as Switzerland can satisfy demands for internationally-accessible services.  Yet, New Brunswick is unlikely to become a world financial centre, which mutes the benefit.

However, the way government promotes bilingualism matters. Requiring all services to be in both languages is unnecessary, especially in areas skewed towards one linguistic group or another. The government justifies this structure by asserting that members of both groups live all around the province, but it is highly unlikely that individuals living in an area dominated by the opposite group will be unilingual. As the Fraser Institute study cited above shows, this kind of policy is quite costly. New Brunswick would be better off directing these resources into promoting bilingual education, which, in addition to its economic benefits, would probably do more to serve–and better integrate–both linguistic groups than blanket regulations mandating bilingual services.

In essence, the state should tailor its strategy toward providing tangible benefits all New Brunswickers, and take a step back to let New Brunswickers form their own unique socio-linguistic identity.

Leo Plumer is an AIMS on Campus Student Fellow who is pursuing an undergraduate degree in economics and political science at McGill University. The views expressed are the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies

An Economic Exploration of Bilingualism, Part One

As an Anglo resident of Montreal, I have gotten to know the city in my three years here as a student. Known as the “cultural capital” of Canada, Montreal is one of the most diverse metropolises in the world. The city has a rather complex demographic history, largely with Anglophone and Francophone residents sharing the island-city through most of its existence. Power and influence has shifted between the English and French since the colonial era, with the Anglophones occupying the business and social elite until a massive cultural shift–the Révolution Tranquille–resulted in the Francophonization of Quebec in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, roughly 60 per cent of Montrealers are native Francophone; Anglophone Montrealers constitute a mere 13 per cent.

Despite these shifts, Montreal is a shining example of bilingualism: Anglophone residents are 80 per cent bilingual and their Francophone counterparts are 51 per cent bilingual. Overall, Montreal is 52 per cent bilingual–the highest rate in Canada.

Economics is the primary driver of the phenomenon: actors make decisions based on perceived value.

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In 1993, Jeffrey Church and Ian King constructed a simple model of the economics of bilingualism, which led them to conclude that network externalities and the cost of learning a new language made it more efficient for a linguistic minority to become bilingual. This model suggests that it is more efficient for Anglophone Montrealers to learn French than it is for their Francophone counterparts to learn English. Unsurprisingly, the number of bilingual Anglophone Montrealers exceeds that of bilingual Francophone residents by a sizable margin. Many Montrealers are bilingual, however, despite one’s origin and considering over half of Francophones identify as bilingual–especially younger Francophone individuals–there must be an omitted variable.

A study published by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2012 notes that Anglophones in French-majority cities assimilate less than Francophone individuals in English-majority cities, which may provide some insight into language diversity in Montreal. English is the lingua franca of the world, for example, and although Francophone residents can sustain themselves in Montreal using solely the French language, the economic incentive to learn English is substantial, especially for those with career prospects abroad. Bilingualism, however, is becoming a standard requirement for obtaining employment in Montreal’s service sector. Moreover, both English and French speaking Montrealers have a variety of incentives to adopt bilingualism and Quebec’s education system makes learning either language quite easy.

In essence, Church and King’s model explains why it is more efficient for Anglophone Montrealers to learn French, whereas the interconnectedness of Montreal with the English-speaking world creates an incentive for Francophone Montrealers to learn English. Alternatively, Montreal’s role as an economic hub that connects to the English-speaking world is a primary driver of the city’s unique bilingual nature: economic incentives outweigh cultural sentimentality.

Montreal has developed a cosmopolitan culture unlike the rest of Quebec, which enhances its standing as a multicultural hub and economic nexus. It certainly should stay that way.

Leo Plumer is an AIMS on Campus Student Fellow who is pursuing an undergraduate degree in economics and political science at McGill University. The views expressed are the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies

Quebec Democracy and Education in Flux

On the date of writing, it was announced that the Parti Quebecois, forming the new minority government of Quebec with 54 of 125 seats, has repealed the tuition increases announced by former Liberal Premier Jean Charest which took effect September 1st, 2012. Pauline Marois, the new premier of Quebec, repeatedly sided with protestors and bore the Carré Rouge, their emblem over what some term the Maple Spring. The protests, which began in the fall of 2011, surged and became most apparent on March 22nd, and caused the delaying of semesters effective May 18 at the Université de Montréal and the Université de Québec á Montréal, are seemingly over.

The net result of boisterous, violent, and disruptive action among tens of thousands of students in forcing an election issue (although Jean Charest likely would have called an election before the province’s inquiry into corruption anyway) is the status quo. Tuition for Quebec residents and French citizens will be maintained at $2,168 per year, the lowest in Canada. The president of the more moderate university federation (FEUQ), Martine Desjardins, immediately tweeted “Victoire! La hausse et la loi sont annulées.” The protestors, apparently, have won. Or have they?

The solution of Quebec’s new government is to take an executive cabinet decision and eliminate the tuition hikes via an order-in-council. This option is hardly democratic. It means that a party winning slightly more than the barest minority of seats required to form a government (54 vs. 50 seats), with only a single percentage point of the popular vote more than its next closest competitor (the Liberal Party of Quebec) determines an issue that can be called controversial at its best and destructive at its worst. The decision takes away the purpose of the legislature of Quebec – as an arbiter of legislation – and completely annuls all other facts of the September 4 election, save for that the PQ got at least 1 more representative than the PLQ.

Given the critiques of the federal Conservative government’s executive action through cabinet decisions and that the legitimacy of their 54% majority in the House of Commons is disputed since it was won with only 39.6% of the national vote, one might expect similar critiques for the Parti Quebecois. The PQ received 31.95% of the vote and 43.20% of legislative seats, while the next party, the Parti Libéral du Quebec, received 31.20% of the vote and 40% of the legislative seats. The effect of an executive decision of such magnitude in Quebec, especially among students, is huge and legitimizes a spring and summer of violence.

Further, the inherent contradiction for Quebec students to support this action by Marois and her cabinet is in the nature of their own “student federations”. The organizing basis for FECQ, FEUQ, and CLASSÉ is a form of direct democracy which consistently requires voting to extend boycotts. Too, one must remember that one of the “leaders” of the strike movement was not a “leader” of the striking coalition at all. Gabriel Nadeau-Dubois of  CLASSÉ  was a “co-porte-parole” or “spokesperson”. Each leader held no executive authority and each decision had to be approved by the larger federations. When Jean Charest’s government met with the negotiators from each of these organizations on May 5th, and signed a tentative deal which stretched the tuition increases over a longer, 7-year period, these bodies still had to approve the decision by referendum (and they did not). If Quebec students want to reform their society and government, and CLASSÉ certainly has these intentions, then it must not compromise its ideal of direct democracy by accepting an executive decision over which the people of Quebec still strongly disagree.

Too, one must still consider the position of Universities in Quebec: underfunded. Each university relies on a balance of money to pay for instructors, auditorium and library facilities, tutoring and advising services, the maintenance of deteriorating buildings, and the apparatus which manages the whole affair. Despite the ‘public’ designation, they are little more than private entities receiving some distribution of public funds and user fees to enhance both the potential of the individual as well as society at large. Universities have their own budgets – and like governments, businesses, and individuals – may run annual deficits and debts. The reduction in the funds a University will receive (or will expect to receive) in its planned budget, simultaneously reduces the services it can provide.

The Globe and Mail’s Jeffery Simpson reports a $600 million dollar funding gap between Quebec universities and those in other provinces. McGill’s Principal and Vice-Chancellor, Heather Munroe-Blum, reports this figure to be even higher, at $750 million. Her university expected the 2012-2013 academic year to result in a deficit of $7 million dollars, after the tuition hikes were applied. Without them, the total cumulative loss of revenue by 2018 will be $90 million for McGill alone. Adding this to the total accumulated debt during 2011-2012 of $275 million provokes more concern, since it means a large amount of money which might otherwise go to the aforementioned services is being spent on interest payments.

These losses in revenue, taken with the above analysis of university funding, result in a loss to the forgotten item in the Quebec Tuition Hikes debate: quality. While university may or may not be (in the protestor’s own words) “accessible”, the benefit one gains from university is likely to decline. Of the 15 Canadian universities in the top 400 of the 2012 QS World University Rankings, only 3 are from Quebec: McGill at 18th (and 1st in Canada), Université de Montréal at 114, and Laval at 324. The Times Higher Education figures from May list 16 Canadian schools in the top 350, of which only McGill and UdeM place from Quebec. These rankings confirm that the overall quality of Quebec education is hardly comparable on the international stage to the rest of Canada, and are reflective of the large funding gap – which would have been bridged by the tuition increase.

If they relish in their “victory” students must realize two consequences: (1) they have supported the undemocratic action of a hardly stable minority government and (2) they will receive an overall lower quality education when compared to their provincial peers. These are not the goals which should propel Quebec into the future, they are regressive and the PQ still can’t repeal Bill 78 by executive decision.

-McKenzie Kibler