Derailing Economic Growth on Cape Breton Island

In a quote that could be easily mistaken for a passage from Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, Cape Breton Regional Municipality (CBRM) Mayor Cecil Clarke said of the St. Peter’s-Sydney line closure, that “The wider economics of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island are larger than those of the shareholding interests right now of Genesee & Wyoming.” Politicizing economic development, as has been done in Cape Breton, is a slippery slope and the millions in financial support from federal, provincial, and municipal governments to keep the Sydney Steel Plant afloat is evidence.

Genesee & Wyoming, a short-line railroad holding company based in Connecticut, decided to close the St. Peter’s-Sydney portion of the Truro-Sydney rail line, which moves more than 22,000 cars annually, transporting paper, coal, lumber, petroleum products, and chemicals. Since 2003, business has declined threefold, despite that company receiving a $20.6 million subsidy to provide services to customers on the Island. The latest rate hike increased prices by more than 300 per cent and left the company with only three customers. Michel Huart, Genesee & Wyoming’s legal counsel, has told the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board that prices were likely to increase again in 2015 if the company operates that line.

CBRM, the Cape Breton Student’s Union, Sydney and Area Chamber of Commerce, and Cape Breton Partnership are lobbying for the railway to continue operations, arguing that it is crucial to existing customers and necessary to develop the Sydney port.

In a market economy, businesses respond to incentives and invest where there is an opportunity for growth. The companies responsible for operating the St. Peter’s-Sydney section of the rail line, however, have received $20.3 million for offering their services to local companies. Yet, despite this subsidy, Genesee & Wyoming would rather shut down the line east of St. Peter’s junction. If a company literally refused to take free money to continue operating that line, the benefits of doing so must be very small, if there are any.  Elected officials in Cape Breton, in addition to the business community there, would like the line to remain ere it is because it provides jobs, easy access to raw materials, and the three remaining customers would have logistical challenges receiving cargo via transport truck. They also argue that it is vital to the development of Cape Breton, particularly because of the Sydney port.

CBRM received government funding to dredge the harbour in 2012 and ostensibly, all that is left is building a container terminal in the Sydney port. The federal and provincial governments, in addition to private investors, have not been eager about the project, however, and the lack of potential customers has some people very concerned about the future of it. According to city councillors and business owners, the problem is that Genesee & Wyoming are shutting down a rail line that operates roughly one train per day and is in need of upwards of hundreds of millions to meet the capacity of larger container ships: without this line, the port will never be developed and Cape Breton will miss out on a great opportunity–or so they say.

This situation is the same we face every few years, but with different actors. Fundamentally, the community has the cause and effect backwards: economic growth comes before economic development, not the other way around. Time, and time again, we call for the government to dredge our harbour, save our railway, build a container terminal, subsidize the steel plant, and the list goes on.

It is nearly impossible to place economic development before growth, particularly because of the risk involved with investing in a community without medium or long-term prospects for growth. There is a reason why the only “big jobs” in Cape Breton are government jobs: private companies do not want to invest in a hostile climate suffocated by government regulation. Imagine the reaction of high-level managers from companies around the world when a company decides to stop operating a rail line that has three customers, even though they received $20.3 million in subsidies.

Nova Scotia, and more broadly, Atlantic Canada, must begin promoting growth before development. Approving the Donkin mine project, fracking operations, and other natural resource extraction is a step in that direction and creating a policy framework that encourages manufacturers to build plants on Cape Breton Island is another. In fact, the CBRM could have approved the operations of an iron pellet plant, creating roughly 500 jobs, but opted, instead, to create Open Hearth Park.

The closure of the St. Peter’s Junction is not about developing the port or the loss of easy transportation, it is a symbol of Cape Breton’s mentality: build it, have the government fund it, and the economic benefits will follow. It is time that our politicians and business owners rethink their relationship with economic development as something that is earned, not bought. Smart decisions will almost always ensure economic development–it is when smart decisions are not working when, perhaps, the government should take a larger role in economic development. But it must stop considering economic development as the end goal: while it is unequivocally beneficial, having a railroad for the sake of having a railroad, particularly because “Halifax has a railroad,” is not conducive to building a productive economy. CBRM’s end goal should be to increase material wealth and wellbeing.

Until the CBRM can better understand the cause and effect relationship between economic growth and economic development, it will remain trapped in a vicious cycle of economic decline.

Corey Schruder is an AIMS on Campus Student Fellow who is pursuing an undergraduate degree in history at Cape Breton University. The views expressed are the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies

Atlantic Canada must make tough energy decisions

Over the course of the past decade, energy issues have become louder and louder in Atlantic Canada; today, energy policy has recently often been the single biggest file for governments in the region. With the Muskrat Falls megaproject, shale gas exploration, and the Energy East pipeline have come a number of decisions Easterners must make—these decisions will play a large part in shaping the region’s economic future.

Let’s first examine the Lower Churchill Project. The project is often simply referred to as “Muskrat Falls,” the waterfall that is being developed for electiricty generation. Muskrat Falls will be owned by Nalcor, which the NL government created in 2007 as a publically-owned electricity-market monopolist. Through its subsidiary NL Hydro, Nalcor has the sole right to supply and sell electricity in the province. And despite the fact that government’s Lower Churchill development plan includes the construction of a Maritime link that connects NL’s electric grid to the mainland’s without passing through Quebec, the NL government has severely restricted interprovincial trade.

By denying Newfoundlanders and Labradorians other electricity options, the province’s government has given Nalcor the power to raise its rates at a whim. This power allows for the construction of the Muskrat Falls project, which will cost $7.7-billion.Without its monopoly, Nalcor would not be able to pay for the project: many economists think the project in uneconomical. In fact, NL’s Public Utilities Board (PUB) could not conclude that the project was the province’s least-cost energy option, stating that there were “gaps in Nalcor’s information and analysis.”

Because of the project’s high costs, the NL government will have to borrow $5-billion—that is, nearly $10,000 for each of its of its residents. With these potential consequences for the both the province’s debt and its electrical rates and output, the NL government’s management of Muskrat Falls will have serious ramifications for the province far into the future.

Muskrat Falls also has ramifications for Nova Scotian energy markets. Emera, Nova Scotia’s publically traded energy corporation will cover 20 per cent of the Maritime link’s cost in exchange for 20 per cent of the electricity produced at Muskrat Falls. Further, Nalcor will be able to use Emera’s transmission rights to sell electricity in the Maritimes and New England.

New Brunswick (NB) faces an equally dramatic energy situation. Two issues dominate energy discussions in the province: hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) and TransCanada’s Energy East pipeline. Tests for shale gas, which NB Premier David Alward hopes will be extracted through fracking, have prompted locals to (often violently) protest. Fiscally, however, potential fracking revenues seem to be the NB government’s only way to pay for its current level of services without raising taxes or adding to the provincial debt, which is approaching $12-billion.

Although New Brunswick’s fracking debate has been Atlantic Canada’s loudest, shale-gas extraction proposals have also provoked argument in NL and Nova Scotia. Recently, the NL government imposed a moratorium on fracking until it has consulted the public and conducted reviews. Nova Scotia has had a fracking moratorium for about two years, though it is set to expire this summer.

New Brunswick can also expect to benefit from the construction of the Energy East pipeline, which will bring Albertan oil to Saint John’s Irving Oil refinery. The most noticeable gains from project will take place during its development and construction: a report by Deloitte found that the pipeline will boost New Brunswick’s GDP by $1.1-billion in this period. And during its 40-year operations phase, the pipeline project will add $1.6-billion to the province’s economy, though it will only directly create 121 permanent jobs.

With Muskrat Falls, NL is taking a significant fiscal risk and trapping consumers with the hope of becoming an energy power. Any jurisdiction that allows fracking must balance the benefits of increased economic activity and royalties with potential environmental harm and local frustrations. And the Energy East pipeline could give NB the sort of economic and fiscal boost it needs. Energy may enrich Atlantic Canada, but squandering it may breed regret.

Michael Sullivan is a 2013-2014 Atlantic Institute for Market Studies’ Student Fellow. The views expressed are the opinion of the author and not necessarily the Institute

Bridging NL’s Urban/Rural Divide

Newfoundland and Labrador (NL), throughout history, has faced several economic impediments. The most famous of these impediments is the collapse of its cod fishery in the 1990s, which placed the viability of coastal communities in question. For instance, from 1991 to 2001 (following the federal government’s 1992 cod moratorium), NL’s rural population as a percentage of the province’s total population dropped 18%.

The primary driver behind the province’s rural population decline is a lack of employment. NL’s key economic determinants (and their jobs), for instance, are chiefly located in urban areas where employment opportunities are greater. Without taking proactive steps, this trend is likely to continue.

Although there is an emergence of specific industries, such as aquaculture, in NL’s rural areas, the biggest concern is the province’s ‘brain drain.’

Of those in rural communities whom choose to continue their studies, a large portion leave and few ever return home. This creates a vicious cycle, the result of which is a shortage of highly trained individuals in the province’s rural areas (thus, limiting innovation and constraining organizations that would otherwise consider operating rural communities).

There are, however, several potential solutions for reducing the gap between NL’s rural and urban communities and, subsequently, growing NL’s rural economies:

1)      Infrastructural development
2)      Labour market assistance
3)      Encouraging immigration

If you build it, they will come.

One potential solution for attracting new talent to the province is to advance research programs and build the additional capacity necessary for extending these programs into the province’s rural communities. The province, for instance, recently became an advocate for extending research and development (R&D) programs, incorporating entities such as the Research and Development Corporation (RDC), which “provides leadership, strategic focus and investments in order to strengthen and improve the research system throughout the province.”

Although it is unlikely that NL will become an R&D hub (like, for instance, Singapore), it is uniquely located for specialized studies, for instance, in aquaculture, Arctic relations, and natural resources development.

Furthermore, the provincial government is capable of improving its labour and immigration market. Firstly, tax-rebates afforded to companies that are establishing themselves can create jobs in the province’s rural areas and, secondly, escalating the province’s immigration recruitment strategy can provide capital for NL’s rural areas that have experienced population decline.

Although these initiatives are cost-intense, the current upkeep rate of NL’s rural infrastructure (and other government services) as a percentage of the province’s GDP is growing annually, requiring greater economic output. Bridging this gap is crucial, therefore, not only for sustaining NL’s current demands, but also for reaching the province’s full economic potential.

Tyler Power is a 2013-2014 Atlantic Institute for Market Studies’ Student Fellow. The views expressed are the opinion of the author and not necessarily the Institute